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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
that envisions insanity as affecting the volitional and emotional aspects of the
human mind as well as the intellectual. If criminal responsibility is to continue
to be prerequisite to a criminal act; and if, as has been suggested, true insanity
is more than the M'Naghten Rule admits with its standards phrased in terms
of intellect alone; then the conclusion is inescapable that in New York, where
intellectual capacity alone controls the determination of legal insanity, truly
insane persons have been and are being found guilty of and punished for
"criminal acts" for which they are not responsible. Modernization of section 1120
of the Penal Law to include volitional and emotional impairments which bear
upon mens rea would seem well in order.
Thomas C. Mack
CONSECUTIVE CITATIONS FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT ALLOWED
On November 1, 1961 petitioner was initially jailed for contempt by giving
"don't remember" answers at a grand jury hearing.1 After serving 30 days in
jail the defendant was subsequently asked similar questions before the same
grand jury, and was sentenced to an additional 30 days by again replying "don't
remember." The Appellate Division affirmed. On appeal, held, affirmed, one
judge dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals, applied lower court law and
persuasive law from other jurisdictions to affirm the lower courts in holding that
a witness could be adjudged in contempt of a grand jury on two consecutive
occasions even though the interrogatories were nearly identical at both hearings.
Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138, 237
N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963).
Contempts are neither wholly civil nor entirely criminal, and this charac-
teristically legal entanglement often results in a fundamental misunderstanding
of the concepts. Punishment per se does not aid in distinguishing the terms, how-
ever the purpose to be served often separates the particular proceedings. 2 In
civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the purpose of benefiting
the complainant and/or the court.3 But in criminal contempt the sentence is
punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.4 The problem of discerning
criminal from civil contempt is further alleviated by statutes which enunciate
the specific contempt to be utilized for certain proceedings and hearings. In the
instant case Cirillo was cited for criminal contempt under the provisions of a
specific state statute.5
Even though immunity from state prosecution will not immunize a witness
from prosecution in other jurisdictions, the witness may nevertheless be
charged with contempt, in the state court granting protection, for refusing
1. People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of City Prison, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424, 226
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962).
2. Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904).
3. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
4. Ibid.
S. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 750. Compare N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 406(3) for an example
of a civil contempt statute.
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to furnish suitable answers.0 Moreover, in New York a witness cannot avoid
punishment for contempt by merely providing obviously evasive answers, as
in the present case where the petitioner conveniently replied "don't remember";
an evasive answer is held in law to be the same as a refusal to answer.7 Interest-
ing however, and a reasonable ground for questioning the rule in the instant case,
is the fact that a witness can only be cited once for contempt if all of the nega-
tions occur at one proceeding; 8 i.e., "the prosecution cannot multiply contempts
by repeated questioning on the same subject of inquiry within which a recal-
citrant witness already has refused answers."
Undeniably the courts have the power to repeatedly interrogate a witness
at successive hearings in an effort to maintain the integrity of the courts. Further-
more any witness is deemed to have a public duty to answer any questions within
his power.' 0 Applying this tenet in the instant case, a case of first impression for
the Court of Appeals, the majority was at liberty to determine the law applicable
to the defendant. The general rule in the United States, based upon scanty case
law, favors the position that recurring refusals to answer a grand jury at
successive hearings will constitute separate punishable contempts. 11 The only
applicable New York law is from a lower court which held on facts similar to
those in the instant case that, "wilful refusals to answer legal and proper in-
terrogatories is a separate and distinct act of criminal contempt even though the
witness may already have been punished for his refusal to answer the same or
substantially the same questions.'
12
Having found defendant's answers evasive at both grand jury hearings, the
Court then proceeded to the main issue of whether there was only one contempt
or two separate contempts. In holding that the defendant was properly punished
for two separate contempts the majority apparently relied upon two public
policy considerations. 3 First, the majority accepted without reservation the
principles developed in the lower court opinion, "the public has a right to every
man's evidence .... Moreover it is a duty not to be grudged or evaded."' 4 Sec-
ond, by discussing the two Valenti (Appalachin) cases, where the defendants
were jailed indefinitely for civil contempt, they in essence condoned the practice
6. Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959); New York v. Lombardozzi, 5 N.Y.2d 1026,
158 N.E.2d 250, 185 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1959).
7. People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of City Prison, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424, 226
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962); 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 126 (1963).
8. People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960).
9. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957). But cf. People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d
210, 140 N.E.2d 252, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1957) (holding a witness guilty of five separate
criminal contempts when he failed to give any answers concerning five entirely different
occurences).
10. People ex rel. Sherwin v. Mead, 92 N.Y. 415 (1883).
11. Williams v. Davis, 27 Cal. 2d 746, 167 P.2d 189 (1946); In the Matter of Ward, 295
Mich. 742, 295 N.W. 483 (1940); State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 200, 224 N.W. 838 (1929);
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 602 (1929); Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 11 Pac. 459 (1886). But cf. Loy
v. Loy, 222 S.W.2d 873 (Tenn. App. 1949).
12. Matter of Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
13. Instant case.
14. Matter of Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 459, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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of confining uncooperative witnesses to lengthy confinements for non-compliance
with court orders. 15
Judge Van Voorhis in dissenting offered a logical common sense approach
in rejecting the majority opinion, "It makes little difference whether a person
is asked the same or related questions 17 times on one day, or on 17 different
days. In each instance he should be found guilty of but a single criminal con-
tempt."' 6 The dissent was realistically concerned over the possible abuses that
might result from zealous prosecutions, and the fundamental personal liberties
that were being unnecessarily jeopardized by the majority's determination. Ac-
cording to Judge Van Voorhis any defendants confronted with successive criminal
contempts ought to be granted a jury trial for perjury to finalize the issue.'
7
The instant case represents an inevitable, yet unfortunately common by-
product of American jurisprudence-confusion. By an historically dictated
method for splitting hairs between analogous factual situations the New York
courts are now facing a dilemma: they must now uphold and defend opposing
rules of law. At one extreme, a witness will only be in contempt once if the
refusals to answer are confined to a single hearing.' 8 If on the other hand an
unfortunate witness, like defendant Cirillo, is recalled at a later date to testify
he will be in danger of further incarceration. 9 Should this issue come before the
courts again perhaps a closer scrutiny might help to amend the self imposed
inconsistency.
Thomas E. Webb
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS
SELF-DEALING BY TRUSTEE'S ATTORNEY DiD NOT VITIATE REAL ESTATE SALE
The Chase Manhattan Bank petitioned Kings County Surrogate's Court
to render and settle their intermediate account as sole surviving executor and
trustee of the estate of Thomas A. Clarke. The Surrogate's Court confirmed the
report of its appointed referee and dismissed the two objections of one of the
beneficiaries. The two objections were that the sale of certain real estate by the
executor was improvident and that the fee granted executor's attorney was im
proper. The basis of this latter charge was that the attorney had received a per-
centage of the brokerage commission. This improper payment to the attorney,
however, was quite indirect. The property had been listed with one agent, Seward,
with whom the attorney had agreed to split any commission. A second agent,
Tilton, produced the ultimate purchaser but was nevertheless prevailed upon by
the attorney to give part of his brokerage fee to the first agent, Seward, who, in
15. Instant case at 209, 188 N.E.2d at 140, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960).
19. See cases at note 11 supra.
